underpins the Children Act 1989, serves to constrain children's participation in an English context. This is followed by an exploration of children's discourses around the issue of being listened to, both within and beyond their families. Current debates about children's participation in family proceedings are then reviewed in the light of the children's evidence. The article concludes by arguing for the adoption of a social model of citizenship, which would foster a greater integration of children's welfare and rights both within and beyond their families.
The child of legal discourse and the construction of the welfare principle
The paramount principle of the Children Act 1989 is that of the welfare of the child. This welfare principle is essentially an adult construction that assumes children to be inadequately socialized dependants in need of care, protection and control (Lansdown, 1994; Roche, 1995 Roche, , 1996 Piper, 1996 Piper, , 1999 Trinder, 1997) . This dependency construction sits somewhat uneasily with a 'liberationist' view that sees children as creative social and moral agents with the capacity to act, to interact and to influence the shape of their childhoods (Archard, 1993; Roche, 1996 Roche, , 1999b .
In practice the welfare orientation of the law operates in a variety of ways to constrain children's participation in private law proceedings (Eekelaar, 1994; Roche, 1991; Sclater, 1998) . Perhaps the most deep seated constraint is the dominant hierarchical construction of 'adult' and 'child' that keeps children in subordinate positions in relation to adults. Put simply, children are presumed to be incompetent and their right to participate is conditional. Their freedom to speak is not a free-standing, autonomous right but is tied to and therefore subordinate to their welfare. Paradoxically, children can only exercise their right to speak if they gain the permission of adults to do so, and they are unlikely to be granted permission unless they can prove that they are 'adult' enough to express a view (and that they have a cast iron case). The whole process relies on adult discretion to judge children's developing competencies (discretion being the appropriate word because 'competency' is nowhere clearly defined [Sawyer, 1997] ).
This reluctance to consult with children is compounded by another presumption underlying English legislation: that of family integrity (what Alanen [1992] has called the familialization of childhood). In contrast to some Scandinavian jurisdictions (Furstenberg, 1997) , English children are seen to 'belong' to their parents rather than to the state. In the context of divorce, they are treated as part of the family system rather than as individuals whose interests might diverge from those of their parents. Where disputes arise over arrangements for their care there is a marked preference for dealing with the parents and resolving disputes through parental agreement rather than engaging directly with the child. The child's welfare can be met simply by getting the parents to agree. It is only where agreement cannot be reached that an investigation of the child's interests is launched by officers of the court, and even then children may not be consulted directly (Cantwell et al., 1999; Jones, 1992; Piper, 1997) . Court welfare officers are encouraged to see a child wherever possible when compiling their reports but they are under no obligation to consult with children directly, let alone represent their views. They may choose to treat children as part of the family 'system' and use their evidence selectively (James and James, 1999; Trinder, 1997) . In contrast to public law (child protection) proceedings, where it is seen as legitimate to dis-aggregate children from their parents, children in private law proceedings remain submerged within their families. Taken together, these presumptions of childhood incompetence and family integrity mean that children are effectively barred from becoming legal actors in their own right (Houghton James, 1994; Lyon et al., 1998; Roche, 1996; Sawyer, 1997; Timms, 1997) .
What of the status of children's views once they are heard? Here too, presumptions about children's inferior status come into play. Much like Article 12 of the UN Convention, children's views under the Children Act have to be 'considered in the light of his [sic] age and understanding'. In other words, adults must assess whether children are competent enough to have their views taken seriously. Yet adult judgements about children's innate intellectual and emotional abilities and their limited moral integrity may not predispose them to respect children's views. In a climate where it is presumed that children may lie, fabricate, fantasize or manipulate (or, alternatively, be manipulated by others), their views are inevitably viewed as untrustworthy Trinder, 1997) . This is part of a widespread developmental view of children that sees them as half-finished 'products' that will become fully socialized only when they reach adulthood. This produces what Cockburn (1998) calls a 'futures' orientation, a tendency to place overriding importance on how children will turn out when they reach adulthood rather than focusing on the nature of their day-to-day lives as children. In a legal setting this may mean that children's long-term interests are prioritized over their immediate or short-term interests. For example, a child may be ordered to have contact with an oppressive parent against the child's wishes because it is presumed that, regardless of the impact in the short term, this will eventually benefit the child . A child's welfare can, therefore, be constructed by adults in ways that may run counter to children's own individualized constructions of their welfare.
Whether children's wishes and feelings carry any weight at all may well depend on how far these wishes accord with current legal presumptions about what they need. What is in the best interests of children whose parents divorce is subject to changing interpretations over time. In the 1950s and 1960s, it was presumed that children were harmed by marital conflict.
Following divorce, their needs were to be met through the provision of a stable home and family unit and an enduring emotional tie with their primary (or psychological) parent, usually their mother (Goldstein et al., 1979) . This notion was so pervasive that it became enshrined in the UN Declaration of the Rights of the Child (1959), which stated that what children needed was their mothers. Subsequently, this interpretation of the child's needs underwent a substantial revision. Children were now presumed to need two biological parents, ideally within an intact family built on marriage but, failing that, in a post-divorce co-parenting arrangement operating across two households (Cockett and Tripp, 1994; Hetherington et al., 1978; Richards, 1982; Wallerstein and Kelly, 1980) . This interpretation of the child's best interests was subsequently endorsed in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989, Article 9(3)) and has since been elevated to a substantive principle of English law (Family Law Act (1996) ). Underlying this new orthodoxy is a revised notion of what damages children. Parental conflict is no longer the prime culprit; it is divorce itself, seen as the 'break up' of the family and the potential for loss of contact between the child and the non-residential parent, that is deemed to cause harm. The nature of the potential damage wrought by divorce is never very clearly spelt out. But it is said to be wide ranging, incorporating images of the 'passive and innocent victim' (educationally, economically and emotionally disadvantaged) through to the 'potential threat' (descent into delinquency, substance abuse or teenage pregnancy) (Piper, 1997 (Piper, , 1999 Roche, 1991; Sclater, 1998) . Children with divorced parents have thus come to be seen as vulnerable 'children in need', whose interests must be safeguarded for them by the law. 4 The point about these shifting orthodoxies is not that one is right and the other wrong, but that children's welfare is notoriously difficult to determine, let alone predict.
5 Blanket formulations such as those outlined in the preceding paragraph are not flexible enough to accommodate the diversity of children's circumstances. Nor do they allow for children's own constructions of their welfare to be taken seriously. In effect they assume a commonality of children's experiences, while glossing over the complexities and pluralities of real lives. If the law presumes to know in advance what arrangements are best for children, then the need to consult with them becomes somewhat superfluous. As a result, the child of legal discourse has become a somewhat generalized, theoretical child rather than a real, embodied, biologically unique and socially differentiated child. Family law thus operates according to a welfare paradigm that allows for a limited notion of children's agency, one that recognizes children's competence to speak but only in carefully prescribed circumstances and according to adult agendas.
Conversations with children
To date, debates on children's participation in family law have rarely included children's own views on the subject. In this section of the article I explore children's perspectives on the issue of being listened to and participating in family decision-making, drawing on data gathered as part of a small programme of research into post-divorce childhoods. The research was based on in-depth, conversational interviews carried out with a sample of 117 young people, who were living under a variety of post-divorce/separation arrangements. 6 The research had three broad aims. We wanted to understand more about the day-to-day lives of these young people, to explore their experiences as children, rather than assessing long-term adjustments or outcomes. We sought to explore 'what matters' to children as a necessary precursor to understanding 'what works' (or doesn't work) for them in their families. Second, we wanted to explore young people's agency within their families by focusing on how they influence and actively contribute to family life (rather than focusing on how their families impact upon them). A third aim of the research was to bring children's voices centrally into policy debates around post-divorce family life and to explore, from the perspective of children, what it means to 'ascertain the wishes and feelings of the child'. Our exploration of this theme was not confined to family law. Our starting point was to explore children's views on participation and choice within their families and to go on to document their reflections on talking to 'outsiders', including friends, wider kin and legal and therapeutic agencies. We wanted to know under what circumstances young people might choose these different sources of support or advocacy and under what conditions they preferred to talk.
Mutual respect in families
The young people in our study regarded meaningful conversation as a crucial ingredient of family life:
[how would you describe your family?] David (15) 7 : It's quite a close knit family because mum and dad, they talk to us a lot . . . I've always had a close relationship with mum 'cos she's quite understanding and loving. . . . It's a lovely family, really, because mum and dad will always go out their way for us, to make sure we're happy Being part of a 'proper' family meant being able to talk to others and be listened to, trust others and be trusted and be treated as a person in one's own right. We have called this an ethic of respect. This ethic is mutual: it is not just a matter of being respected and trusted but of respecting and trusting others. The children in our study aspired to achieve such relationships with both their parents (although, in practice, they tended to rely more on their mothers for day-to-day support and for confiding in). They also placed a high value on relations of mutual respect and civility between their parents. Children recognize, of course, that this is not always possible after a divorce but, at the least, they wanted their parents to manage their conflicts in ways that did not implicate them or force them to take sides. Overall, they valued being part of a network of supportive relationships which included both parents and could be extended to include new partners ). Similar findings have been reported in other studies of children's family relationships (Brannen et al., 2000; Katz, 1999a Katz, , 1999b Morrow, 1998 Morrow, , 1999 .
The majority of children in our sample enjoyed good quality relationships with family members, based on open communications and shared understanding. A minority, however, did not enjoy such relationships with one or both parents. Some felt marginalized by the way they were treated by a parent, and/or by their parents' treatment of each other:
[What's your idea of a good mother?] Maya (15) : I don't know really, sort of like a nice mum, I suppose, you know, who will actually listen to you, instead of shouting back.
[How does your family compare with your friends' families?]
Maya: I don't know really, the mothers always seem a lot kinder . . . I have this image of these really nice parents . . . but our family definitely isn't like that. . . . It's stressful because nobody really gets on. . . . Sometimes I wish I had a different family. My mum isn't really that close. She doesn't listen. . . . Whenever I try to talk to mum or something or try to ask her something it sort of conflicts. . . . It's just like I'm a person who lives here . . . sort of like a tenant. 
Catherine (20):
My dad sometimes made you feel that you weren't that important and that it didn't matter if you weren't there. He isn't the sort of person I talk to about me. . . . He won't speak to my mum. . . . Another reason, I suppose, why I didn't really like going was because he slagged my mum off to me and that was horrible because, no matter what he thought about her or she thought about him, they were still, like my mum and dad. . . . It was quite hard because you wished that, even if they were divorced, that they'd just be a bit more normal, that they could at least be civil to each other.
There is widespread evidence to suggest that poor communication and lack of mutual respect between parent and child, and between parents themselves, are major causes of distress for children following parental divorce and separation. 8 Family life is and perhaps always has been characterized by a range of parenting styles ('authoritarian', 'permissive', 'absent' and 'democratic') and there are many children who continue to experience their families as sites of oppression. But there is an ideological shift towards a democratic style that is replacing the old adages that children should respect their elders and be seen but not heard (de Winter, 1997) .
Participation or choice?
We wanted to know whether children aspired to participate in decision-making or make autonomous choices, and in what circumstances the latter course of action might become desirable or necessary. The answer to this question depends, in part, on the nature of the decision to be made (Morrow, 1999) . As we have seen, the older children in our sample attached importance to their autonomy when it came to making decisions about their personal lives, for example about their personal appearance or social activities (although they also wanted to be able to consult with their parents as part of the process). Younger children, too, might want some degree of personal autonomy. But in dealing with decisions which affected other family members, such as contact and residence, self-determination was seen as more problematic. In exploring this issue, we gave the children a vignette in which we asked them to consider what a hypothetical child should do if she or he had been asked to choose which parent to live with. As a rider to this, we asked whom they felt should make such decisions in families. Their replies reflected the complexity of this issue:
Mark (15) : I think he should have an opinion, I don't think he should necessarily decide, he should get a say in it, he shouldn't just be left out, I mean it's his life as well, he shouldn't be stuck with someone he didn't want to be with.
Percy (10):
They should have a vote or something. . . . If he has a brother and they both choose different places then it's going to be even more complicated. The parents should decide really.
Nina (12):
She should be involved in sorting it out but I don't think her parents should actually make her choose or anything, because she's going to feel awful is she says one parent and lets the other one down.
Ralph (8) These young people took their rights of participation in their families for granted. What they valued, however, was participation in a democratic process of decision-making rather than the right to make autonomous decisions. In other words, they distinguished between participation and choice, recognizing that compromises might have to be reached (Morrow, 1998 (Morrow, , 1999 Trinder, 1997) .
A substantial number of children in our sample had negotiated family practices in these democratic ways. Decisions could be made by consensus, or, for younger children, they could be delegated to one or both parents in the knowledge that the parents would understand their feelings and act in their best interests. This is what Boyden and Ennew (1997) have called a 'weak', as opposed to a 'strong' sense of participation. Built into this democratic process is recognition of the fluidity of family life. Arrangements could be flexible and open to renegotiation according to the changing needs of family members. This flexibility was not only important for children of high school age who wanted to balance their family commitments with their social lives but was also valued by younger children. James and his parents, for example, used trial and error to determine what kind of co-parenting arrangement would work best for them: James (9): I thought I'd probably like to spend a bit more time at each house, so I said, 'can I spend a week [instead]?' We talked about it and thought, 'well, a week is a long time, but . . .'. Then we decided we'd try it and if it didn't work we'd go back to before. . . . We tried it . . . just as a test . . . and thought about it and then we went back for a few weeks . . . and then we decided it might be a good idea.
In such families it was accepted that young people might want to try out new ways of doing things, even to the extent of making mistakes and learning from them.
But not all children can work democratically with their parents. Where the children in our sample had experienced relations of oppression or neglect in their families, their answers to the vignette about who should choose a child's residence were somewhat different:
Helen (8): I think she should choose, in case her mum is really horrible to her, or her dad is really horrible to her. . . .
Sally (12):
I think it's important that the child should choose, because I wish I could have chosen . . . I don't know, it takes a lot of thought because you don't want to make the wrong decision or hurt any of your family.
Such children were more likely to assert their right to decide for themselves who they would live with and how much they would see their parents (although as Sally shows, such decisions cannot be taken lightly for they run the risk of alienating family members). These children tried to find ways to work round an oppressive parent. Alistair, for example, had a difficult relationship with his father, who frequently lost his temper and resorted to physical punishments. Alistair relied heavily on his mother for support and, with her help, negotiated a change in contact arrangements that gave him more weekends with his mother. He did not need professional involvement because of his mother's effectiveness in managing the negotiations on his behalf. Much of what is currently perceived almost automatically as 'manipulation' of a child's views by a parent might just as appropriately be seen in this light: as a parent consciously seeking to understand their child's point of view and actively supporting them (Davis and Roberts, 1989; Smart and Neale, 1999) .
Support/advocacy beyond the family
We wanted to know under what circumstances children might seek help outside their immediate family and whom they might turn to first. In exploring this question, we gave the children a vignette about a child who wanted his parents to stop arguing over contact and asked what the child should do. For most children the strategy was obvious; the child should talk to the parents, explain the problem and ask them to stop. We then asked what they should do if this strategy didn't work, in particular, whether the child should talk to someone outside the family:
Alistair (11): Well, I wouldn't [talk to an outsider] 'cos it's more of a family thing.
Ben (14) : He could talk to his granny or one of his mum's friends. I mean if he sort of went to talk to someone outside his family then it would probably get around and make the situation worse.
Quentin (13) : Someone in his family, . . . they can talk to his parents Pele (10): 'Cos they might not listen to a child as much as another adult.
David (15) : Talking to your friends is quite important, to give their opinion and just to help . . . as long as he can trust that person not to go telling people because I wouldn't want everyone knowing.
Sally (12):
She could talk to a friend because then she wouldn't tell anyone. . . . Last year I talked to my friend Joanna and she helped me a lot . . . she convinced me to tell my teacher. . . . So, friends are a lot of help.
There was a marked preference among these young people for keeping family problems within the immediate family where possible or, failing that, using informal sources of support such as wider kin or friends. Kin were seen as useful sources of advocacy. Friends, on the other hand, could be accessed independently, without adult knowledge and at the child's initiative, and they offered non-judgemental, egalitarian support, along with the opportunity for a reciprocal exchange of experiences. Crucially, they also offered confidentiality or a 'safe space'. They could be relied on 'not to tell anyone', especially not family members or other adults. There were no consequences from this kind of interaction other than an opportunity to crystallize one's thinking about what, if anything, needed to be done. For some children this was all that was needed for them to feel that they had the resilience to manage a problem by themselves. For others, such as Sally, using such a safe space was an empowering process, enabling them to work out what the next step might be and to take it at their own pace. Peer support schemes and services like Childline, which offer independent access and confidentiality, are also highly valued by children as a first step in taking a problem outside the family. As Cooper (1999: 156) observes, 'We can only be sure "what children want" if we create conditions under which children are able to find out what they think about their predicaments and this is not something which courts have been designed to facilitate.'
Using therapeutic and legal services
Approximately 20 percent of the young people in our study had had direct experience of legal, mediation or therapeutic services but in most cases they had only vague recollections of the process. Those young people who could recall their experiences were less than complementary about them. Maya, for example, had been referred for family therapy:
Maya (15): Sometimes I get really sort of upset, . . . first of all [mum] took me to the doctors, and said, 'oh there's something wrong with you, Maya'. . . . Then, it's sort of like this child psychologist stuff, but, I don't know, it's just the approach that they had, it just sort of made me cry more. I feel more comfortable talking to you because I know there's nobody staring at me. . . . There was about seven of them [behind the mirror]. It felt weird, you know, because you don't know what they're doing and most of the time I was just sitting there, you know, and with my stepdad there as well, he didn't agree with anything I was saying. He was saying, 'no, no, no it's not like that, it's like this, blah, blah, blah . . .'. He's always so decisive . .. I don't know, I didn't really find it helped. . . . I just didn't really talk much because, I mean the other people around me, it's just like including my mum and stepdad, it's just, you know . . . This therapy lacked privacy as well as confidentiality and was an effacing experience for Maya in that it seemed to replicate the oppressive treatment
she was receiving at home. She was treated as part of her family and not given a chance to speak confidentially about herself as a person in her own right. The problem had been presented to her as a problem of her own making, she was intimidated by the number of professionals involved and had no one to help her express her views. Similar experiences have been reported for children attending family meetings at court and those interviewed under the children's panel system in Scotland (Griffiths and Kandel, 2000; Trinder, 1997) . 9 As a further example, Alex had been referred to a counsellor but stopped attending after two sessions:
Alex (12): When they first split up there was this counsellor at school and mum arranged for me to meet her every Monday but that was annoying because I had to miss PT. . . . I really didn't like her. She just, basically asked questions, like you're doing but she didn't put them in the same way. She didn't, like, make me think about stuff, she made me tell her stuff [emphasis in the original].
Being made to turn up at a time which did not suit him, in a school setting where his peers would inevitably know of the referral, and being 'made to tell' by the counsellor, coloured his experiences so that he did not feel he had received sympathetic, non-judgemental support.
Children who had been referred to the court welfare service as part of their parents' legal disputes over residence were equally disillusioned with the process. One such dispute, for example, was eventually resolved by persuading a full-time mother who had recently fled the family home to accept good contact rather than residence of her two children. This outcome went against the strongly expressed wishes of her young daughter, who was adamant that 'girls need their mums'. But while she had been consulted, her views, at the age of 7, were discounted; it was decided that she should not be separated from her older brother who wished to remain in the family home with his father. She continued to miss her mother and commented wryly, 'If the court chooses, you don't get a word in edgeways. ' Two other children had endured years of legal dispute between their parents over residence and contact. The problem, as they defined it, was less the issue of where they lived or how long they spent with each parent, but the fact of the dispute itself. Caroline, then aged 13, had decided, in consultation with a district judge, 10 that shared residence would be a fair compromise, while Molly, then 15, chose to change residence and live with her father:
Caroline (17) : I wanted to split the thing because I wanted to keep my mum happy still and I wanted to keep my dad happy, so I thought a week each, but my mum didn't want that. . . . It didn't work.
Molly (22):
The court welfare officer and that, they don't really know the family. I don't think it helped talking to her, nobody gets on with everybody do they? I didn't see why everybody should ask all these questions and when you do tell them certain things it doesn't go in the report . . . I only really told them what they wanted to hear. . . . I really had no one to talk to, sort of thing, so I just made up my mind [about which parent to live with] and that were it. . . . Somebody else to be involved is an idea, who isn't going to go straight back and say, 'well this and this' to the [court] but just get them sat down and sort of talk between them, and if you do want them to pass it on, they would.
Molly's 'evidence' was used selectively and she had no confidential space in which to crystallize her thinking or explore alternative strategies for dealing with her warring parents. The narrow judicial focus on the issue of residence did not resolve the parental conflicts in these cases but only intensified them, with further repercussions for the young women. Caroline suffered bitter recriminations and oppressive treatment from her mother for 'interfering' in the legal process and failing to support her mother's position, while Molly's mother took an overdose and thereafter made further applications to court to get the residence decision reversed. Eventually both girls found their own means of resolving the conflicts. Molly left home at the age of 17 and stopped contact with her father, while Caroline went to live permanently with her father and stopped contact with her mother.
Just as children might differ in what they perceive as solutions to the problems in their families, they might also differ in the way they define the problems in the first place. But these child-led agendas do not necessarily fit the agendas of the court. Legal solutions that downplay or ignore children's own perceptions of the problem might be perceived as no solution at all by children themselves .
One of the significant factors about the cases reviewed above was that the children had been referred to the various agencies without any choice on their part. Consequently, they saw professional involvement not so much as 'support' but as 'intervention', almost to the point of 'interrogation'. This was so even where the purpose of the encounter was therapeutic rather than investigative. As noted already, gaining access to legal services is notoriously difficult for children (Sawyer, 1997 (Sawyer, , 1999 . Two of the children in our sample had sought outside support for themselves -in both cases the services of a solicitor -and this had, in both cases, been facilitated by a parent. Karl, who was trapped between warring parents, wanted a flexible contact arrangement which he could control for himself but found it difficult to convince his solicitor that his views were his own:
Karl (15) Maintaining his autonomy was the only way that Karl could appear fair to both his parents and convince his solicitor that he was not being manipulated. He managed to steer a middle ground between the different agendas of his mother, father and the solicitor and eventually secured an order for flexible contact. Sandy's attempts to change residence and thereby escape an oppressive father were less successful:
Sandy (13): I wrote to a solicitor . . . I just wanted to know how I could get something done about going to live with my mum. That's what I wrote. . . . It was a relief to do something about it. . . . I didn't tell my dad, I had tried to talk to him but he wouldn't listen.
Sandy found, however, that the solicitor was unwilling to take up his case. His mother supported him and began proceedings for a residence order but in the face of staunch opposition from the father and the lack of legal support, Sandy was forced to back down. Both of these young people were suspected of being manipulated and doubts were cast on their personal integrity. These were demeaning experiences for them, particularly for Sandy, whose problems were unresolved.
Overall, these young people saw professional support as a last resort. One of the main problems, as children see it, in talking to 'outsiders' is precisely their perception that family issues are best kept in the family and that by talking to professional agencies they are somehow being disloyal or escalating problems so that they seem insurmountable or out of control. Where children cannot talk to a parent they may have real fears of repercussions if a parent should find out that they have turned to outside agencies for help or have otherwise 'undermined' their parent's position (Childline, 1998) . The experiences reported here also suggest that children may have valid grounds for feeling ambivalent about professional involvement. Our data are limited and unrepresentative 11 but are supported by wider evidence which suggests that children do not generally perceive adults beyond the boundaries of their families as reliable sources of support, help or empowerment Masson and Oakley, 1998) . Indeed, they are more likely to view them as bossy, inflexible, unfair, dismissive, intrusive, intimidating, interrogatory, critical, patronizing, judgemental, condescending, coercive, deceitful, secretive and untrustworthy, as reinforcing in myriad ways their superiority to children (Cantwell, 1996; Morrow, 1999; Williamson and Butler, 1995) . If adults 'other' children, seeing them as essentially different (Cockburn, 1998) then children also 'other' adults in ways that determines their own behaviour and expectations towards them. Either way this 'othering' is not conducive to good relationships between adults and children, nor does it foster children's competence to express their views or take part in decision-making.
Recent research has indicated that, whatever the impact of divorce on children, there are other significant factors at play that can make a difference (Hetherington and Stanley-Hagan, 1999; Rodgers and Pryor, 1998) . Relations of respect and meaningful communication between family members would seem to be crucially important here. This is hardly surprising, since these are the key components of citizenship. In a world where children have few civil rights, the family is the one setting where they can aspire to being treated as people in their own right. The children's accounts also suggest that ongoing conversations conducted as a daily part of family life are more likely to hold value for them than stilted, 'one-off' consultations with sociolegal professionals. Building in the right conditions for listening effectively to children is not an easy or straightforward task. Adults would have to learn to trust and respect children's judgements and accord them the integrity to act in morally responsible ways. In effect they would have to begin 'observing the elementary rules of democracy' in their dealings with children (de Winter, 1997: 139) .
The participation debate in family law
The issue of involving children in private family law proceedings has been the subject of much analysis and debate in England and it remains controversial. Policy-makers have recently come under renewed pressure to grant children separate representation in these proceedings. Two rationales have been put forward for changing the operation of the law. The first is a welfarist argument that challenges the presumption of family integrity. Proponents argue that children may be harmed if they are excluded from professional decision-making, particularly in a context where they cannot necessarily rely on parental support. 12 This argument has been fuelled by concerns that parents cannot be trusted to meet their children's needs at the point of divorce or when parental conflicts arise, because they are presumed to have a 'diminished capacity' to parent properly. Granting children a voice at the point of divorce, it is said, will allow for their welfare to be properly investigated and secured, thereby bringing a necessary corrective to the current balance of power between parents and the state (James and James, 1999; Lyon et al., 1998; Timms, 1997) .
In contrast, those who defend current policy and practice argue, also along welfarist lines, that it is not necessarily in children's best interests to be dragged into decision-making, or to voice their views in a way that sets them apart from or even in opposition to their parents. Participation, which, in this formulation, is not clearly distinguished from decision-making (Children's Rights Office, 1995), is deemed harmful to children, placing undue burdens of responsibility and guilt on them at too young an age and compromising their loyalties. There are also significant resource implications if children are to be made parties to disputes (Jones, 1992) . Rather than forcing children to express a view they should retain their right to 'act like children' and let others decide for them (Cantwell and Scott, 1995; Law Commission, 1988: 3.23) . 13 Whatever the relative merits of these opposing views, they are couched in the language of what is 'good' or 'bad' for children, rather than in the language of what children themselves might want or be entitled to. Underlying these arguments is a subterranean debate about which group of adults (mothers, fathers, legal, welfare or therapeutic professionals) are best equipped to take charge of children's welfare needs, a debate from which children themselves have been largely excluded (Shamgar-Handelman, 1994) .
A second line of argument for promoting children's participation is a rights-based argument that challenges the presumption of childhood incompetence (Freeman, 1997) . Granting children a voice, it is said, will liberate them from adult oppression and bring a necessary corrective to the current balance of power between adults and children. As Roche (1996) observes, in a world where children have few political, economic or material resources but only words and bodies with which to resist adult power claims, the language of rights and political citizenship may be a critical resource for them. While this argument is powerful and persuasive, framing the debate in this way has certain drawbacks. Much like welfarist arguments, the rights approach glosses over the important distinction between participation and individual choice. Participation becomes equated with a legal or political model of citizenship, one based on the individualized ethics of autonomy, personal freedom and self-determination (Children's Rights Office, 1995; Roche, 1999) . As a result, the issue tends to become polarized in a way that universalizes children's interests and needs and appears to set children and adults in opposition to each other (Minow, 1987; Morrow, 1999) .
14 Just as welfarists argue over what is 'good' for children, so liberationists argue over what is 'right' for children, particularly over what strategies should be adopted to secure children's participation and whether an autonomous, rights-based power struggle is a necessary or desirable part of the process.
Of course, resolving the issue of what is 'good' or 'right' for childrenin-general is inherently difficult when the needs and interests of individual children are so varied. Once children's perspectives are brought into the picture, however, it becomes possible to move beyond these impasses. As we have seen, the children in our study who had experienced neglect or disrespect from a parent were forceful in insisting that children should be able to choose residence and contact arrangements. In these contexts, specialist support, an independent voice and legal representation were seen as crucial to a child's well-being. Children will clearly assert their rights to self-determination where their family relationships are oppressive or abusive. On the other hand, most young people in our study did not espouse a politicized, rightsbased model of citizenship for themselves in a family context. They did not need to because they had already secured parental trust and respect, and thereby achieved citizenship in their families. Rather than asserting their rights to individual choice or autonomy, they aspired to good communications and inclusion in decision-making. At times of family change they were more likely to value their privacy and make use of informal networks of support than to seek public involvement in and scrutiny of their circumstances. 15 If someone should be listening to children, then children prefer their parents to undertake this task and it seems that where parents are doing this, state intervention is neither needed nor wanted.
These differing points of view from children about their participation are inevitable, for they reflect children's varied experiences of family life. What is good for one child may well be bad for another, an insight that is too easily glossed over in a system driven by adult-centric notions of welfare. Blanket rules designed to predict when children are 'in need' (as well as what they need) are not likely to be flexible enough to respond to their diverse circumstances. Equally, what is right for one child may be wrong for another; an overly rigid discourse of rights may be no less problematic for children than a presumptive discourse of welfare. This does not necessarily mean that we should abandon the language of welfare or rights for children: after all, both are important. But these concepts need to be refashioned if they are to work in the interests of real children.
The language of social citizenship has much to offer here. Under this model, rights and welfare are contextualized within social relationships and practices rather than understood simply in the context of impartial reasoning and public legislation (Kiss, 1997; Roche, 1999b) . Such a model acknowledges that children's rights, interests, needs and competencies are not identical but vary from child to child according to age, gender, cultural context, family dynamics and circumstance (in much the same way that adult interests and competencies vary). In this way, children's interests are context specific, arising out of and in tune with their lived experiences. A social model of citizenship is closely aligned with children's own thinking, for it grounds the individualized rights of recognition, respect and participation within the relational ethics of care, responsibility and interdependence. 16 As Kiss (1997: 8) observes, 'Rights must begin in small places, close to home.' This model has further advantages over a politicized model of rights; it does not imply a power struggle between adults and children and the necessity for adults to relinquish some of their power, a position which, understandably, adults may well resist. It allows for a more nuanced understanding of the position of children in relation to adults, one which acknowledges the possibility of mutuality as well as oppression, and the value of connectedness as well as individuality (Brannen and O'Brien, 1996; Roche, 1996) .
What might social citizenship mean for family law and professional practice? As a starting point, the debate over children's participation would need to be reframed. A system that allows for a range of solutions to the problems faced by children, and a range of processes (non-legalistic as well as legalistic) for identifying and working towards those solutions, would be needed. The vexed (and essentially welfarist) question concerning when should the state intervene in children's family lives could be replaced by a more fruitful, 'citizenship' question: how can the state provide a flexible range of support services for children that they can access as and when they need them? In short, an approach founded on social citizenship requires the development of a responsive mode of provision, 17 one that allows for open and independent access for children who need help but respects the privacy and integrity of those who do not. Of course, for this to happen, adults would have to accord children the competence to act in morally responsible ways and allow them to determine for themselves whether and in what way to exercise their right to be heard. They would also need to find new ways of engaging with children based on trust in their judgements and respect for their views. In particular, practitioners would need to abandon their preconceived ideas about welfare and rights and, instead, cultivate a healthy degree of uncertainty about what individual children might need or want (Trinder, 1997) . These strategies would depend upon adults giving children an adequate knowledge of their rights of participation and protection, and empowering them, through the provision of local information, to know how to exercise those rights should they need to do so. Complementary strategies, such as promoting children's citizenship among adults and providing support programmes for parents, would also be needed (Children's Rights Office, 1995; Murch et al., 1998; Neale and Smart, 2001) . Through these strategies, a social model of citizenship would allow for the rights and welfare of children to be more closely integrated in family law and professional practice. More broadly, it could provide an effective framework for fostering meaningful communications between adults and children, both within and outside their families.
Notes
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